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4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts planted a CI secret stealer in 1,806+ repositories.

An attacker used stolen credentials to push a secret-stealing workflow into thousands of repositories, according to Aikido Security. Treat every secret reachable from affected workflows as compromised.

هذا التقرير متاح بالإنجليزية فقط.

Starting Tuesday, an attacker used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to plant a secret-stealing payload in repositories those accounts could write to. The Hacker News, citing Aikido Security, reported the campaign on November 12.


Each intrusion began with a test pull request titled "docs: dependency audit notes" from a branch named wfx-docs, used to check write access. Test PRs were opened in 61,764 repositories. Aikido says the stealer ran in at least 1,806 of them.


SafeDep published a separate count: 8,093 repositories received malicious commits between 12:46 UTC Tuesday and 04:36 UTC on November 12. That covers only public default branches, so the true total is likely higher. In 7,309 repositories the stealer was added to an existing workflow. In 771 it was an npm postinstall hook, which also executes on developer machines.


Why it matters. The payload goes after CI secrets and variables, the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and Actions runtime tokens, AI service keys, and credential files for AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI and SSH. On self-hosted runners it also reads cloud credentials from instance metadata. Data leaves by HTTP POST to several IP addresses on port 8080 and to a Telegram chat.


The stealer also escalates. It exchanges GitHub OIDC tokens for AWS, GCP and Azure sessions, and can create long-lived AWS IAM access keys. It can rewrite an AWS role's trust policy to allow any AWS account, and it can add Azure AD federated credentials prefixed wfx-ci-, which allow sign-in without a stored secret.


The attacker usually reverted changes quickly and deleted run logs. Aikido reports that accounts used this week overlap with those hit in the GhostAction wave in October, but it does not attribute November to the same actor at this stage.


Other affected packages named in the reporting: Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio v3.14.3 is malicious; Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280 carry the stealer in a workflow file; 28 WebdriverIO repositories were hit through commits by the wdio-bot account.


Indicators reported by Aikido and SafeDep:


Branches: wfx-docs, chore/ plus eight alphanumeric characters, ci-check- plus four digits.


PR title: "docs: dependency audit notes".


Commit messages: "ci: refresh build cache", "chore: add ci helper", "chore: add dependency audit workflow".


Files: .ci-xxxxxx.sh and .github/workflows/build-audit-xxxxxx.yml.


Exfiltration IPs: 194.150.166[.]244:8080, 18.143.168[.]96:8080, 153.75.82[.]159:8080.


Stealer SHA-256: 89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cf.


Mitigation. Treat every secret and cloud role available to workflows in affected repositories as compromised, and rotate them all. Revoke the commit author's tokens, OAuth app grants, SSH keys and sessions, and turn on 2FA. Treat any machine that ran npm install on an affected commit as compromised. Block Packagist v3.14.3 and pin v3.14.2 or earlier.


Hunt in your logs. In Entra ID, look for wfx-ci-* federated credentials. In AWS CloudTrail, look for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity or AssumeRole sessions named wfx-*, followed by CreateAccessKey or UpdateAssumeRolePolicy. In GCP, check GenerateAccessToken and SignJwt calls from your GitHub workload identity pool. In Vault, check JWT logins from the GitHub OIDC issuer. Aikido notes that a missing run number on the attacker's commit is a more reliable sign than missing artifacts or cache entries.

يتطلب صلاحية دخول.

سجل الأحداث المشفّر الكامل وإجراءات المعالجة متاحة بعد تسجيل الدخول.